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Manifest Disregard and the Imperfect Procedural
Justice of Arbitration
Thomas V Burch*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925,
an ongoing debate over the importance of efficiency versus accuracy in
arbitration has ensued. Much of the debate has focused on the FAA's
statutory and nonstatutory grounds for vacatur, particularly on the
manifest-disregard doctrine. Critics claim this doctrine implicitly
encourages parties to appeal arbitration awards, citing empirical evidence
to show that parties rely on it more than any other ground for vacatur.
Supporters claim manifest disregard is necessary-even in the limited
form that courts usually apply it-to protect parties from arbitrators who
fail to follow the law. Either way, the debate itself reveals arbitration as
a form of imperfect procedural justice that is based, at least in part, on a
utilitarian balancing of procedural costs and the desire for accurate
outcomes.'
But that's no surprise. Congress passed the FAA with this basic idea
in mind. And the United States Supreme Court implicitly recognized the
idea when creating the manifest-disregard standard in Wilko v. Swan.2
The issue this Article addresses, then, is whether arbitration should focus
more on accuracy or on the costs of achieving it. More specifically, it
examines whether the manifest-disregard doctrine, in its current form,
. Assistant Visiting Professor in Law, Florida State University College of Law. Many thanks
to Beth Burch, Brannon Denning, and Stephen Ware for thoughts and comments on previous drafts.
All errors, of course, are my own.
1 See JOH4N RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85-89 (1971) (explaining imperfect procedural
justice as a set of procedures that aims for the correct result while considering "other ends of the
law" and trying to achieve "the greatest net balance of satisfaction"); Lawrence B. Solum,
Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 240 (2004) ("[11mperfect procedural justice incorporates
the notion of an independent criterion for accuracy but adds the notion of 'other ends of the law,' or
considerations of cost that may be balanced against accuracy."). I further explore this idea in Part II
of this Article.
2. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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strikes a reasonable balance between these competing interests in the
mandatory-arbitration context.3
Parts II and III explore the manifest-disregard doctrine, procedural
justice in mandatory arbitration, and the relationship between the two.
They explain that mandatory arbitration diminishes procedural justice
because it creates a control imbalance between the parties and because
parties who are subjected to it perceive it as unfair.4 These parties dislike
being subjected to a dispute-resolution process with limited judicial
review. Consider, for example, the narrow manifest-disregard standard
that most courts apply. Those courts refuse to review an arbitration
award's accuracy unless the moving party shows that the arbitrator
consciously ignored known, applicable law. It is virtually impossible for
parties to satisfy this standard, which is problematic in mandatory
arbitration because parties already have so little control over the process.
Parts II and III use this disconnect between manifest disregard and
procedural-justice values to support the idea of expanded judicial review
under the manifest-disregard standard in mandatory arbitration.
Part IV then explains the limitations of the current manifest-
disregard standard and proposes a new standard for courts and other
commentators to consider. Specifically, it contends that courts should
expand the standard to review awards for legal error in mandatory
arbitration-although only for parties who did not draft the arbitration
agreement. This will increase decision control by creating a procedural
mechanism for correcting arbitrators' mistakes, thereby increasing
mandatory arbitration's procedural fairness. Part IV also suggests certain
safeguards that should reduce potential abuse of the expanded standard
and enhance its procedural fairness, including sanctions and reasoned
opinions. This is a case-centric method, and it is an alternative to the
3. "Mandatory arbitration," as used in this Article, refers to employment disputes, consumer
disputes, and franchise disputes as those disputes are defined in the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009.
See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111 th Cong. § 3(6) (1st Sess. 2009). It also refers
to any arbitration involving (a) a statute that protects civil rights or (b) parties with grossly unequal
bargaining power. The former appears in the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009; the latter appears in
the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 (although without the "grossly" qualifier). Id. § 4(4);
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 11 0th Cong. § 4(4) (1st Sess. 2007).
4. To be clear, I am not attempting to compare arbitration's procedural justice to the
procedural justice of trials or any other dispute-resolution procedure. Two of the points I make in
this Article are (a) that courts place too much emphasis on the limited-review principle-narnely,
efficiency-in mandatory arbitration, which has led to calls for abolishing mandatory arbitration and
(b) that instead of abolishing mandatory arbitration, we should place more emphasis on accuracy,
and less on efficiency, by expanding the manifest-disregard standard in the mandatory-arbitration
context. So, instead of comparing the procedural justice of arbitration to the procedural justice of
trials, I am simply saying that if we are going to allow mandatory arbitration to exist, we should
enhance its procedural fairness.
48 [Vol. 59
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incoherent and inequitable manifest-disregard standard that exists today.
More broadly, it is an alternative method of reforming mandatory
arbitration-an idea that seems to be gaining popular appeal.5
II. ARBITRATION AND IMPERFECT PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
The Federal Arbitration Act's legislative history shows that Congress
wanted to create an efficient dispute-resolution system that would respect
parties' rights to an accurate award.6 But that same history does not
show where, exactly, Congress wanted to draw the line between these
competing interests.' So courts have been tasked with crafting an
arbitration system that fleshes out Congress's amorphous intent, and the
result has been a patchwork of decisions that elevates efficiency over
accuracy and fairness.
5. See Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 11Ith Cong. § 125 (1st
Sess. 2009) (giving the proposed agency the power to prohibit or impose limitations of mandatory
arbitration by rule if the agency decides such a rule would benefit the public interest); H.R. 1020,
§ 4(4) (attempting to eliminate predispute arbitration agreements for consumer, employment, and
franchise disputes and for disputes arising under statutes that protect civil rights); H.R. 3010, § 4(4)
(same); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1674-75 (2005) (calling for a new approach to mandatory arbitration because it is "unjust");
Press Release, Nat'l Arbitration Forum, National Arbitration Forum to Cease Administering All
Consumer Arbitrations in Response to Mounting Legal and Legislative Challenges (July 19, 2009)
(on file with author), available at http://www.adrforum.com/newsroom.aspx?itemlD=1528.
6, See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924) ("The [enforcement] procedure is very simple,
following the lines of ordinary motion procedure, reducing technicality, delay, and expense to a
minimum and at the same time safeguarding the rights of the parties.").
7. While the FAA includes several grounds for overturning arbitration awards, those grounds
are narrow. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (stating that courts may overturn arbitration awards where
there is evidence of an award procured by fraud, partiality or corruption of the arbitrators,
misconduct by the arbitrators in refusing to postpone a hearing or failing to hear evidence, or
arbitrators exceeding their powers). So one could assume that in choosing between efficiency and
accuracy, Congress chose efficiency. Although the assumption probably would be correct, the
reasoning would be thin.
8. For example, starting in the 1980s the Supreme Court pushed a "national policy favoring
arbitration," encouraging courts to enforce arbitration agreements and subjecting a wider range of
disputes to arbitration. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) ("In enacting § 2 of
the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed
to resolve by arbitration."); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001)
(extending the reach of the FAA over statutory claims); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1991) (finding that ADEA claims may be resolved through arbitration);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1989) (finding that
claims under the Securities Act of 1933 may be resolved through arbitration); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (finding that statutory claims may
be resolved through arbitration). Lower courts have relied on this national policy as a rationale for
giving greater deference to arbitrators' decisions, thus reducing the likelihood of those decisions
being overturned on appeal. See, e.g., Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Indus., Inc., 142 F.3d 926, 930 (6th
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While some commentators claim that this emphasis on efficiency has
caused arbitration to become "lawless," 9 most believe that courts are
getting it right-that Congress intended efficiency to be the compelling
interest.' 0 Ultimately I agree. But I also believe the emphasis on
efficiency versus accuracy has shifted over time, with Congress and the
public placing increasing emphasis on accuracy in recent years."
This shift is a reaction against the Supreme Court's "national policy
favoring arbitration" and the corresponding growth of mandatory
arbitration over the last two decades.12  Consumers, employees, patients,
Cir. 1998); Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 356 (N.D.
Ala. 1984).
9. See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 783 (2002) ("Arbitrators of course may choose to follow the law-nothing
requires them not to-but if they do, it's not because they have any obligation to do so, and it's not
something that a litigant or her attorney can count on going in."); Heinrich Kronstein, Business
Arbitration-Instrument of Private Government, 54 YALE L.J. 36, 66 (1944) (criticizing the
"lawlessness" of organized arbitration). But see Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?,
40 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 187, 190 (2006) ("[P]erhaps surprisingly, the available empirical evidence to
date provides at best weak support for the view that arbitration is 'lawless."'); William W. Park, The
Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1241, 1290 n.217 (2003) ("The assertion that arbitrators are allowed to be lawless is at odds with the
existence of 'manifest disregard of the law' as a standard for judicial review, and inconsistent with
the provisions of many arbitration rules."). The same debate exists over arbitration under state laws
that are based on the Uniform Arbitration Act and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act. But under
those Acts, fairness may be gaining ground on efficiency as the preferred policy. See generally, e.g.,
Michael H. LeRoy, Misguided Fairness? Regulating Arbitration by Statute: Empirical Evidence of
Declining Award Finality, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 551 (2008) (expressing concerns that state
arbitration statutes based on the RUAA elevate fairness principles over finality of awards).
10. See, e.g., Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law Standard:
The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DIsP. RESOL. 117, 118 (stating that
finality is the "essential feature" of arbitration); LeRoy, supra note 9, at 581 ("The FAA was passed
to make arbitration a quick, efficient, low-cost alternative to courts."); Michael H. LeRoy & Peter
Feuille, Happily Never After: When Final and Binding Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale Ending, 13
HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 167, 205 (2008) ("When arbitration becomes a preliminary step in a
prolonged dispute resolution process, it has failed.").
11. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 11Ith Cong. § 2(5) (1st Sess. 2009)
("Mandatory arbitration undermines the development of public law for civil rights and consumer
rights, because there is no meaningful judicial review of arbitrators' decisions."); see also U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 62 (2009) ("Many consumers do not know ... that a
private party dependent on large firms for their business will decide the case without offering the
right to appeal or a public review of decisions."), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/
docs/regsfFinalReport web.pdf; Calvin William Sharpe, Integrity Review of Statutory Arbitration
Awards, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 311 (2003) (calling for greater review of awards in arbitrations involving
statutory claims).
12. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 10 ("In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a
national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum
for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."); see also
Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1632-33 (explaining how the "national policy" led to an increase in
mandatory arbitration).
50o (Vol. 59
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franchisees, and public interest groups are demanding more procedural
fairness in arbitration, usually by calling for greater judicial review of
legally inaccurate awards. They believe that being "forced" into a
dispute resolution procedure with few options for error correction is
unfair, which explains the increased tension over arbitration's efficiency
policy, including questions over whether it justifies limiting certain
parties' procedural right to challenge legally inaccurate awards."
This ongoing conflict between efficiency and accuracy shows that
arbitration is a form of imperfect procedural justice, one that has
independent criteria for accuracy while also considering "other ends of
the law." 14 The following Section briefly examines procedural justice in
arbitration, with a particular focus on the role that manifest disregard
plays in balancing efficiency and accuracy. It starts with a brief
background on the concept of procedural justice.
A. A Primer on Procedural Justice
Procedural justice has been considered in two different contexts:
political philosophy and social psychology. While this Article
principally addresses the latter, it initially uses the former to explain
arbitration's particular brand of procedural justice, drawing from John
Rawls to illustrate what arbitration is and what it is not.
In A Theory ofJustice, Rawls set out three basic forms of procedural
justice: perfect, imperfect, and pure.15 He illustrated perfect procedural
justice by describing a fair process for equally dividing a cake (making
the assumption that an equal division is a fair division). 6  The person
slicing the cake takes the last piece, thereby ensuring equal shares.' 7
This illustrates the two main features of perfect procedural justice.18
First, it has an independent criterion for determining what constitutes the
correct result-equal slices.'9 Second, it has a procedure for ensuring the
13. As the Court expanded the scope of arbitrable claims and encouraged lower courts to defer
to arbitrators' awards, efficiency was one of its main justifications, but it still expressed support for
accurate awards. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628 ("By agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits
to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.").
14. See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 85.
15. Id. at 83-90.
16. Id. at 85.
17. Id.
I8. Id
19. This independent criterion is defined separately from the procedure used to obtain the fair
division. Id.
51
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desired outcome-slicer picks last.20  As Rawls conceded, perfect
procedural justice is rare in "cases of much practical interest."2
Unlike perfect procedural justice, pure procedural justice has no
independent criterion for determining the correct result.2 2 Instead, it has
fair procedures that, if followed, lead to a fair outcome.2 3 Take, for
instance, Rawls's gambling example. If a group of people undertakes a
series of fair bets, then the distribution of money after the last bet is fair
whatever it is-assuming, among other things, that no one cheats.24 This
is so because the betting procedures are fair and because the group
members freely choose to place the bets under conditions that are fair.25
But fair procedures translate into fair results only when carried out.2 6 So,
because there is no independent criterion for determining fair results,
achieving pure procedural justice depends on implementing the fair
procedures. 27
Finally, Rawls illustrated imperfect procedural justice by describing
a criminal trial.28 The desired outcome is that the defendant is found
guilty only if she committed the act she has been accused of
committing.29 But it is impossible to design procedures that consistently
achieve this result.3 o The trick, then, is to design procedures that
promote accuracy while also considering the law's other ends, like
costs. 3  Thus, the characteristic feature of imperfect procedural justice is
an independent criterion for a desired outcome-conviction only if
guilty-but no feasible procedure for consistently obtaining that outcome
because "other ends of the law" must be considered.32
Arbitration fits Rawis's concept of imperfect procedural justice.
Although it has an independent criterion for determining the correct
result-perfect accuracy for awards-it has no feasible procedure for
achieving that result because it takes costs into account. In other words,
20. Id
21, Id.
22. Id at 86.
23. Id.
24. Id
25. Id
26. Id.
27. Id. at 86-87.
28. Id. at 85.
29. Id
30. Id.; see also Solum, supra note 1, at 185 ("Procedural perfection is unattainable. No
conceivable system of procedure can guarantee perfect accuracy.").
31. It requires, in other words, balancing. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 85.
3 2. Id.
52 [Vol. 59
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because arbitration is designed to be an efficient process, it cannot
guarantee the awards' accuracy. This presents a challenge when courts
are asked to confirm or vacate arbitrators' decisions. Judges dislike
approving inaccurate awards, especially in cases where parties have
unequal bargaining power. Yet, judges also recognize arbitration's
limited-review principle. So they are forced to balance their desire for
accuracy against arbitration's efficiency policy. Efficiency typically
wins at the expense of accurate outcomes.33
To Rawls, the idea behind procedural justice is designing a process
that leads to just outcomes. 34 But Rawls wrote to a very different
audience; he did not explore this idea in the context of resolving legal
disputes. John Thibaut and Laurens Walker were two of the first to do
so.3s They studied parties' psychological responses to variations in
dispute-resolution procedures, and, in a series of studies and articles,
they advanced three arguments regarding parties' procedural preferences:
(1) that perceptions of procedural fairness influence procedural
preferences, (2) that distribution of control within procedures determines
preferences, and (3) that parties prefer procedures that allow them to
control the information that is used to resolve the dispute.16  Their
arguments show the importance of control and of parties' subjective
views on procedural fairness-two of procedural justice's main
features.
As to control, Thibaut and Walker identified two types. The first,
process control, refers to control over the development and presentation
33. This is exhibited by the narrow manifest-disregard standard that most courts apply. See
cases cited supra note 8. Those courts refuse to review arbitration awards for legal error unless the
moving party shows that the arbitrator consciously ignored known, applicable law. See cases cited
supra note 8. Legal mistakes usually do not suffice under this standard. See Norman S. Poser,
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471,
471-72 (1998) (explaining the Second Circuit's manifest-disregard standard).
34. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 85.
35. See JOHN W. THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS vii (1975) [hereinafter THIBAUT & WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE]; Pauline Houlden et
al., Preference for Modes of Dispute Resolution as a Function of Process and Decision Control, 14
J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 13 (1978); John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of
Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541, 541 (1978) thereinafter Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of
Procedure]; John Thibaut et al., Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1273
(1974); Laurens Walker et al., The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L.
REv. 1401, 1401 (1979).
36. Debra L. Shapiro & Jeanne M. Brett, Comparing Three Processes Underlying Judgments of
Procedural Justice: A Field Study of Mediation and Arbitration, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1167, 1167 (1993) (summarizing Thibaut and Walker's work).
37. See Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants' Perceptions of Dispute Resolution
Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REV. 63, 71 (2008)
(discussing the importance of these features in procedural justice).
53
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of information used to resolve a dispute.38 The second, decision control,
focuses on a party's ability to shape a dispute's outcome.39  In
arbitration, parties typically have high process control and low decision
control. 40 But that varies based on the disparity in parties' bargaining
power. The party with the greatest bargaining power dictates control
distribution. That is, the party with greater bargaining power controls the
arbitration agreement, so it also controls how disputes under the
agreement are resolved. Too much control diminishes procedural justice
for the other party to the dispute because the other party has little
influence over the process or outcome.4'
As to parties' subjective views on procedural fairness, Thibaut and
Walker's work supports three important ideas. First, parties' satisfaction
with procedural fairness strongly correlates with parties' outcome
satisfaction.4 2 In other words, parties are more likely to be satisfied with
an outcome if they believe the procedure used to obtain it was fair.43
Employing fair procedures also enhances the chances of parties
accepting and complying with the outcome, thus reducing the likelihood
of post-dispute conflict and enforcement costs." Second, because the
parties "own" their dispute and want control over how their dispute is
resolved, their preferences should guide its resolution.45 This simply
38. For example, giving a party the right to plan how it will present evidence enhances that
party's process control. Thibaut & Walker, A Theory ofProcedure, supra note 35, at 546.
39. Id. ("Decision control is measured by the degree to which any one of the participants may
unilaterally determine the outcome of the dispute.").
40. Robert Folger, Mediation, Arbitration, and the Psychology of Procedural Justice, in I
RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 57, 58 (1986).
41. See Stemlight, supra note 5, at 1635 ("[lIt is highly problematic to permit the most
powerful actors in a society to craft a dispute resolution system that is best for them but not
necessarily their opponents or the public at large.").
42. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
66 (1988) ("A number of studies have found evidence of either direct or indirect enhancement of
evaluations of legal outcomes when procedures are viewed as fair."); THIBAUT & WALKER,
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 94 (same).
43. See THIBAUT & WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 94; see also Walker et
al., supra note 35, at 1415-16 (stating that perceptions of procedural justice enhance perceptions of
outcomes for participants in the decision-making process).
44. See Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 37, at 72-73 (citing studies); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural
Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REv. 26, 26 (2007) [hereinafter Tyler, Procedural Justice and the
Courts]; Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule ofLaw, 30 CRIME &
JUST. 283, 284 (2003); Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social
Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REv. 361, 367 (2001); Walker et al., supra note 35, at 1416.
45, Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 37, at 71; see also Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with
Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L.
871, 874-75 (1997) (stating that justice "develops from the concerns, needs, and values of the people
who bring their problems to the legal system").
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means that legal decisions, to the extent possible, should follow a
procedure that the parties agree is just.46  Finally, parties' subjective
views are important because "they can be used to advance the goals of
democratic governance."A' That is, legal procedures should be consistent
with the public's values and desires over time. 48  Given this need for
consistency, we should translate parties' subjective views on procedures
into policies effectuating those views.
But procedural justice doesn't focus solely on parties' subjective
beliefs; it has an objective component as well. So it can be discussed in
terms of subjective or objective standards. In other words, procedural
justice can focus on what makes some procedures seem fairer than
others, or it can focus on whether certain procedures lead to more
accurate or just outcomes. 51 While this is consistent with the two main
goals of the judicial system-to correctly apply the law to given sets of
facts and to apply the law in such a way that parties willingly comply
with courts' decisions52-these goals often conflict. The question, then,
is whether procedures for applying the law can confer legitimacy on an
incorrect decision.
Although some tension between outcome-based and process-based
models of procedural justice exists,53 research has shown that parties may
independently assess outcomes and the procedures that lead to them. 54 In
other words, the outcome need not be favorable for the parties to
perceive the procedure as fair. Parties assess the procedure itself,
specifically evaluating the amount of control it offersfs And the
46. Tyler, supra note 45, at 874 ("People should be able to willingly embrace the solutions
reached in legal proceedings.").
47. Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 37, at 71; see also Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and
Dispute Resolution: The Problem ofArbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 282 (2004) ("As
a dispute-resolution process, arbitration is generally undemocratic, but it acquires democratic
legitimacy when parties actually agree to arbitrate their disputes because it furthers the unifying
democratic value of personal autonomy. When involuntary, however, arbitration only frustrates the
larger goals of democratic governance.").
48. See Tyler, supra note 45, at 871-72; Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 37, at 71.
49. Shestowksy & Brett, supra note 37, at 71-72.
50. LIND & TYLER, supra note 42, at 3 ("The justice of social processes, procedures, and
outcomes can be discussed with reference to either subjective or objective standards.").
51. Id.
52. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, supra note 44, at 26.
53. LIND & TYLER, supra note 42, at 1-2 ("There is a tension between outcome-based and
process-based models of the person that manifests itself repeatedly in procedural justice research.").
54. Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 37, at 68-69 (citing studies); see also LIND & TYLER, supra
note 42.
55. Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 37, at 68-69 (citing studies).
56. Id. at 69 (citing studies); Shapiro & Brett, supra note 36, at 1167.
55
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outcome alone does not always reflect parties' overall satisfaction with
the dispute resolution process. Rather, process satisfaction is a function
of both the outcome and the fairness of the procedures followed.57 Thus,
parties might consider themselves bound to an incorrect decision "if it
results from a procedure that affords [the parties] a meaningful
opportunity to participate in a process that strikes a reasonable balance
between the goal of accurate outcomes and the inevitable costs imposed
by any system of dispute resolution."5 8  And that is the issue this Article
addresses in the mandatory-arbitration context. Does its system of
procedures, specifically focusing on the doctrine of manifest disregard,
strike that reasonable balance? The answer is no, and the next Section
explains why.
B. Procedural Justice, Mandatory Arbitration, and Decision Control
When Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitration
typically involved business-to-business disputes.59 But the Supreme
Court subsequently announced a "national policy favoring arbitration"
that encouraged courts to enforce arbitration agreements,o which, in
turn, spawned an increase in mandatory arbitration." Businesses began
57. See Deborah R. Hensler, Judging Arbitration: The Findings of Procedural Justice
Research, in AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 41, 43 (Thomas
E. Carbonneau et al. eds., 2006) (stating that procedural justice scholars have "consistently found
that the degree of satisfaction with the legal process is a function of an individual's perception of the
fairness of both the process and the outcome").
58. Solum, supra note 1, at 190.
59. See Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1636 (noting that mandatory arbitration has emerged over
the last two decades); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703, 712-13 (1999) ("Only recently, however, has
arbitration become significant outside the commercial and labor areas. This expansion was largely
driven by the Supreme Court. The Court's arbitration decisions over the last twenty-five years
greatly expanded the scope of arbitrable claims."); Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral
Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REv. 449, 459 (2004)
("The use of arbitration has changed significantly since the FAA's inception in 1925, from the
traditional model involving voluntary arbitration between parties of relatively equal bargaining
power, to a system where arbitration has become a profession and a commercialized industry that is
imposed upon consumers and employees."). Sternlight also notes that Congress probably did not
intend arbitration to be used by businesses against consumers. Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1636
("Indeed, to the limited extent that the possibility of such arbitration was considered by Congress in
1925, when it passed the FAA, those few who spoke on the issue made clear that they did not view
such a use of arbitration as appropriate.").
60. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
61. See Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1632 (explaining how the "national policy" led to an
increase in mandatory arbitration). Section 2 of the FAA makes arbitration provisions in contracts
"evidencing a transaction involving commerce" enforceable. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). The Supreme
Court's "national policy favoring arbitration" coincided with its expansion of the Commerce Clause
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requiring consumers, employees, franchisees, patients, and others to
arbitrate disputes and limited those parties' basic procedural rights
through their arbitration agreements.62 And they implemented these
agreements knowing how difficult it is to overturn an arbitration award
on appeal. In other words, they implemented favorable procedural
changes under their arbitration agreements knowing that their changes
would be insulated from judicial review."
Enforcing these mandatory-arbitration agreements negatively affects
perceptions of procedural justice. It seems unfair that a party can design
a process that limits basic procedural rights and impose it on another,
particularly if that process limits judicial review. Parties
understandably question procedural fairness under such circumstances.6 6
And if legal decisions should be reached following a procedure that the
parties agree is just, then each party's procedural preferences should be
taken into account.6 Thibaut and Walker showed the importance of
these subjective views on procedural faimess. 68 And other studies have
shown the importance that parties in arbitration place on fairness overall.
to cover activities "affecting" interstate commerce, which could help explain the Court's expansion
of disputes that can be subject to arbitration over the last twenty to twenty-five years. See
Southland, 465 U.S. at 10-11 (discussing the national policy favoring arbitration in conjunction with
the Commerce Clause); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74
(1995) (same).
62. For example, some mandatory arbitration agreements contain provisions that severely limit
discovery, eliminate the right to class actions, forbid cross-examination of witnesses, and impose
biased arbitrators. See Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1644-45; Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting
with Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 253, 262-63 (2004) (stating that parties who draft the arbitration agreement can create
procedural rules that "can eliminate or severely limit basic procedural rights, including affordable
access to the dispute resolution forum, discovery, class action, live hearings and cross-examination
of witnesses, the use of unbiased decisionmakers, process transparency, and reasoned, written
opinions.").
63. See Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1637-38, 1645-46.
64. Thornburg, supra note 62, at 266 ("A further problem is that the FAA largely insulates
procedural changes and limitations on remedies from judicial review."); see also Stemlight, supra
note 5, at 1644-46 (discussing the difficulty of appealing an arbitration award).
65. See Stemlight, supra note 5, at 1671 ("Even if the process which is being forced is itself
'fair,' the forcing of that process on one side by the other raises the concern, from a procedural
justice standpoint, that the process is tainted.").
66. See Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost ofCompulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1624-25
(2005) ("The results of compelling the use of ADR are predictable. No matter how benign its goals
and its rhetoric, compelled ADR often thwarts disputant independence and fails to provide those
sorts of procedures capable of assuaging concerns about fairness.").
67. See Tyler, supra note 45, at 874 (stating that the parties to a dispute should reach a
consensus about what is just); see also Linda Musante et al., The Effects of Control on Perceived
Fairness of Procedures and Outcomes, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 223, 225 (1983)
(finding that allowing parties to participate in rule selection enhances procedural justice).
68. See Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 37, at 71 (describing Thibaut and Walker's work).
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For example, Richard Naimark and Stephanie Keer authored a recent
study that asked arbitration participants to rank eight factors in order of
importance: fair and just result, cost, monetary award, finality of
decision, speed, arbitrator expertise, privacy, and future relations.69 "Fair
and just result" ranked first by a substantial margin, with eighty-one
percent of participants giving it the highest possible ranking. 70 "Cost,"
"speed," "arbitrator expertise," and "monetary award" were part of a
four-way statistical tie for second.7 1  And "finality" came in just behind
that group.72  Thus, "fair and just result" outranked the other, more
traditional arbitration characteristics.
The authors also found that "fair and just result" includes elements of
substantive and procedural justice.73 So the parties care about getting the
right result in the right way. 74 Mandatory arbitration inhibits procedural
justice in this regard because it creates a control imbalance between the
parties.75 The party with less bargaining power has little to no say in
how the arbitration will proceed, and it has little control over the ultimate
award. This is problematic given that one of the fundamental
characteristics of procedural justice is control.76 Parties like control over
the outcome-decision control-and control over the procedures that
lead to the outcome-process control. 7 In fact, several studies
69. See Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, International Private Commercial
Arbitration: Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People, 30 INT'L BUS. LAW.
203, 203-04 (2002) (describing the study).
70. Id. at 204 ("This means that a fair and just result was nearly twice as important as the next
closest rankings."). "Fair and just result" ranked first among both claimants and respondents. Id.
Also, participants ranked all of the characteristics both before and after their arbitrations. Id. The
percentage of participants who ranked "fair and just result" as the most important characteristic
actually increased in the surveys given after the arbitration proceedings. Id.
71. Id. at 206. There was a small difference between the rankings for "cost" and "monetary
award." Id. at 204. Forty-six percent of the participants gave "cost" the highest possible ranking,
while forty-three percent gave "monetary award" the highest possible ranking. Id.
72. Id. at 207. While this study was performed on international commercial arbitration, its
results are nevertheless instructive for mandatory arbitrations between commercial parties and
individuals.
73. Id at 205.
74. Id. ("Simply winning does not explain the ranking tendency. Getting the result in the 'right
way', procedural justice also speaks strongly to the participants in these arbitrations.").
75. EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 6-7
(2006) ("Bilateral consent to arbitrate is essential to autonomy and to freedom. If only one party
wants arbitration, the other party loses party control.").
76. See Thibaut & Walker, A Theory ofProcedure, supra note 35, at 546 ("The distribution of
control among the procedural group participants is the most significant factor in characterizing a
procedural system."); see also Folger, supra note 40, at 57-58 (same); Shapiro & Brett, supra note
36, at 1167 (discussing the importance of control in procedural justice).
77. See Thibaut & Walker, A Theory ofProcedure, supra note 35, at 546 ("'Control' involves at
least two elements: control over the decision and control over the process."); see also Folger, supra
58 [Vol. 59
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performed in the context of arbitration have shown that parties prefer
direct control over the outcome in the form of appeal mechanisms.78
Giving such control to the parties enhances procedural justice. 9 This is
true not only because it represents an opportunity to exercise control, but
also because it indicates that the system safeguards against error and
bias.80
For example, Donna Shestowsky published a study in 2004 that
examined preferences for decision control, process control, and control
over substantive rules in small-claim disputes between individuals.8 '
Taking into account social status (equal versus lower) and role (plaintiff
versus defendant), Shestowsky looked into the type of dispute-resolution
features that parties prefer and whether parties' preferences varied
depending on the type of dispute.82 Through three separate experiments,
she ultimately found that parties prefer having veto power over a third
party's decision to having a third party make a binding decision.83
It is therefore worth considering how much control parties in
mandatory arbitration should have over rejecting an arbitrator's award.
More specifically, given the conflict in arbitration between efficiency
and accuracy, it is worth considering the control that parties have over
rejecting an arbitrator's award for legal error and whether that control is
sufficient from a procedural justice standpoint. The answer, in short, is
that parties have multiple grounds for appealing an award,84 but only one
of the available grounds, manifest disregard, allows courts to examine
the accuracy of the award while taking into consideration "other ends of
note 40, at 58 (describing decision control and process control).
78. Folger, supra note 40, at 63-69 (summarizing studies); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Nonjurisdictionality or Inequity, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 64, 67 (2007) ("For litigants,
appellate process is inherently part of procedural justice.").
79. Folger, supra note 40, at 68.
80, Id. at 67.
81. Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Closer,
Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 211 (2004),
82. Id at 211-12.
83. Id at 233-35, 240-41. Shestowsky stated that, because her study involved small-claims
disputes between individuals, "the findings reported here may not apply to higher stake civil
disputes, disputes with corporations, or disputes involving issues relevant to criminal law." Id at
214. But the results of her study do seem to translate to disputes between individuals and
commercial parties, anecdotally at least. Consider, for example, how much of the recent push
against mandatory arbitration has been based on the lack of judicial review for legally inaccurate
awards. See sources cited supra note I1.
84. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (listing the circumstances under which a court may vacate an
award); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (discussing judicial review of arbitration
awards), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989).
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the law," like costs.85 Manifest disregard forces courts to balance the
importance of efficiency and accuracy in arbitration, thus showing
arbitration as a form of imperfect procedural justice.86  The question,
then, is whether manifest disregard, in its current form, strikes a
reasonable balance between these competing interests.
III. MANIFEST DISREGARD IN ITS CURRENT FORM
When reviewing arbitration awards, courts struggle to balance
efficiency and accuracy, particularly when it comes to applying the
87
manifest-disregard doctrine. In part, this is because the doctrine
remains largely undefined; courts can mold it to fit the needs of any
particular case." But whatever the cause, the result has been a myriad of
inconsistent interpretations of the doctrine. Some are based on the idea
that an arbitrator cannot consciously ignore known, applicable law.
Some focus less on the arbitrator's mental state and more on the inequity
of allowing an egregious legal error to stand regardless of whether the
arbitrator intended the error. Because of these inconsistencies, it is a
flawed doctrine, and it will continue to be flawed until courts adopt a
more consistent way to apply it.
85. See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 85 (explaining the balance of accuracy against other ends of
the law).
86. See Poser, supra note 33, at 505 ("[Tjhe manifest disregard ground is an attempt to balance
'the public interest in having arbitrators stay within the applicable law versus the public policy in
favor of speedy and economical function of the arbitration process."' (quoting Marta B. Varela,
Arbitration and the Doctrine ofManifest Disregard, 49 DisP. RESOL. J. 64, 71 (1994))).
87. Some interpret the manifest-disregard standard more broadly than others, thus subjecting
awards to more detailed review. Compare Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 240
(1st Cir. 1995) ("in order to demonstrate that the arbitrator both recognized and ignored the
applicable law, 'there must be some showing in the record, other than the result obtained, that the
arbitrators knew the law and expressly disregarded it."' (citations omitted)), and Health Servs.
Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[T]o vacate an arbitration award for
manifest disregard of the law, there must be something beyond and different from mere error in law
or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law. . . ."), with Willemijn
Houdstennaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[A)
court may infer that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law if it finds that the error made by
the arbitrators is so obvious that it would be instantly perceived by the average person qualified to
serve as an arbitrator."), Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(stating that the Supreme Court's "assumptions regarding the arbitration of statutory claims are valid
only if judicial review under the 'manifest disregard of the law' standard is sufficiently rigorous to
ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied statutory law."), and Advest, Inc. v.
McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990) ("In certain circumstances, the governing law may have
such widespread familiarity, pristine clarity, and irrefutable applicability that a court could assume
the arbitrators knew the rule and, notwithstanding, swept it under the rug.").
88. See Hayford, supra note 10, at 122-32 (explaining how courts have given manifest
disregard different, and conflicting, definitions over time).
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But before explaining how the current doctrinal applications should
be changed, this Article first explains, in a little more detail, why. To do
so requires a brief history of the doctrine, a description of its different
applications, and an explanation of how those applications reflect courts'
inability to choose between efficiency and accuracy as the more
important arbitration policy.
A. The Foundation of and Methods of Applying, the Doctrine
The Supreme Court created the manifest-disregard-of-the-law
doctrine in 1953.89 And it did so as dicta in a case that it subsequently
overturned (on other grounds). 90 In fact, all the Court said was, "In
unrestricted submissions, . . . the interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation."9' That was the
extent of the Court's discussion. It gave no further details on what
manifest disregard of the law meant, and it gave no indication that it even
intended manifest disregard to constitute a new ground for vacating
arbitration awards under the FAA. So the doctrine has no concrete
foundation, which is the most frequent criticism against it.93
But that has not prevented lower courts-and the Supreme Court
itself-from continuing to recognize the doctrine as a ground for
vacating arbitration awards. In fact, every federal circuit court of appeals
has adopted it (although the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have since
renounced it)," many state courts have adopted it,9 5 and parties seeking
89. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (first mentioning manifest disregard).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008) ("Maybe the term 'manifest
disregard' was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to the § 10
grounds collectively, rather than adding to them.").
93. See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 10, at 121-22 (stating that the lack of clarity in Wilko has left
the law of vacatur in "disarray").
94. Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L. J. 547,
567 (2005) ("Despite its humble origins and lack of explication from the Supreme Court, the
'manifest disregard' doctrine has taken hold in every federal circuit and in many state courts."). The
Fifth Circuit, after the Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street, decided that manifest disregard is no
longer a ground for vacatur under the FAA. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349,
350 (5th Cir. 2009). The Eleventh Circuit recently took this position as well. Frazier v.
CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010). These circuits so far are alone amongst
the circuit courts of appeals in reaching this conclusion. See Hiro N. Aragaki, The Mess of Manifest
Disregard, 119 YALE L.J. ONLiNE 1, 4 (2009), http://yalelawjournal.org/2009/09/29/aragaki.htnm
(explaining that the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits continue to recognize manifest disregard
after Hall Street).
61
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to overturn arbitration awards now rely on manifest disregard more
frequently than any other ground for vacatur.9 6  In short, it is widely
recognized and widely used as a ground for trying to vacate awards
under the FAA.
Yet, the Supreme Court rarely has addressed the doctrine since
creating it,97 and only recently did the Court give it any substantive
analysis. So lower courts freely applied the doctrine over the last fifty
years without any real constraints on its scope or method of application.
Naturally, this led to varied applications of the doctrine-some very
broad, some extremely narrow, but all attempting to balance arbitration's
competing goals of efficiency and accuracy.
The first method of applying manifest disregard is known as the
"futility-acknowledged" approach.99 It is based on the level of difficulty
involved in determining whether an arbitrator has consciously decided to
ignore known, applicable law, especially if the arbitrator did not issue a
reasoned award. 00 Courts following this approach will not apply the
manifest-disregard doctrine unless direct evidence exists that the
arbitrator consciously disregarded the law.)ot  This, obviously, is a
95. Scodro, supra note 94, at 567.
96. See, e.g., LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 10, at 189 (finding in an empirical study of labor
arbitrations that manifest disregard was the most frequently used ground for vacatur); Scodro, supra
note 94, at 567 ("Today, parties dissatisfied with arbitral awards routinely seek judicial review on
the theory that arbitrators 'manifestly disregarded the law' in reaching their decisions .... ).
97. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (citing Wilko and
mentioning manifest disregard in a parenthetical following the cite); Shearson/Ain. Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231 (1987) (citing Wilko and quoting its sentence on manifest disregard);
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 258-59, 268 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(acknowledging manifest disregard and citing Wilko); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 656 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that arbitration awards
may be overturned if they are in manifest disregard of the law); see also Scodro, supra note 94, at
567 ("A majority of the Supreme Court has only even hinted approval of the doctrine on one
occasion since Wilko was decided in 1953.").
98. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008) (expressing a belief that
manifest disregard of the law could fall under one of the existing statutory grounds for vacatur under
the FAA). I will discuss Hall Street in more detail shortly.
99. Hayford, supra note 10, at 125-26 (citing Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d
234, 240 (1st Cir. 1995); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th
Cir. 1995); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990)).
100. Id.; see also P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2005) ("Put
differently, 'disregard implies that the arbitrators appreciated the existence of a governing legal rule
but wilfully [sic] decided not to apply it. As arbitrators need not explain their award, and did not do
so here, it is no wonder that appellant is hard pressed to satisfy the exacting criteria for invocation of
the doctrine."' (citations otnitted)), abrogatedon other grounds by Hall St., 552 U.S. at 583.
101. Hayford, supra note 10, at 126; see also Scodro, supra note 94, at 570 (noting that most
courts will limit the manifest-disregard doctrine to "instances in which 'the law is totally clear, the
arbitrator understood the law, and chose to ignore it."').
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severely limited approach; in fact, it essentially makes the doctrine a
nullity.' 02  Without a reasoned award, or a transcript of the proceedings
showing that the arbitrator explicitly refused to follow the law, it is
nearly impossible to convince a court to overturn an award under this
standard. 0 3 Even worse, if the arbitrator does not know the law, then the
arbitrator cannot consciously disregard it. So this standard actually
encourages arbitrator ignorance and punishes parties who-through
incompetent counsel or lack of counsel altogether-fail to educate the
arbitrator on what the law is.104 Most courts that recognize manifest
disregard as a ground for overturning awards appear to use this
approach. 0 5
The second method of applying manifest disregard is the "big-error"
approach.o 6 As its name implies, this approach does not require direct
evidence that the arbitrator consciously disregarded the law; instead, it
focuses on whether the arbitrator made an egregious mistake. 0 7 In short,
it allows a court to overturn an arbitration award by assuming that the
arbitrator consciously disregarded known, applicable law based simply
on the law's clarity and the arbitrator's failure to apply it.'08 This is the
broadest potential application of the manifest-disregard doctrine and the
least frequently used. Any court that uses it does so despite Wilko's
102. Hayford, supra note 10, at 126.
103. Poser, supra note 33, at 505-06 ("Given the fact that arbitrators seldom write opinions
explaining their decisions, there is little likelihood that a losing party in an arbitration will be able to
persuade a reviewing court that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law.").
104. See id at 515 ("Because the manifest disregard standard protects an arbitral award from
vacatur if the arbitrators did not know the law, it encourages arbitrators not to find out what the law
is and at the same time penalizes parties who fail to bring the law to the arbitrators' attention . . . .");
see also LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 564
(2d ed. 1997) ("Under the 'manifest disregard' standard of review, it appears that a court could
confirm an arbitrator's award that was based on an erroneous interpretation of a federal statute as
long as the arbitrator did not know that the award conflicted with the statute.").
105. Hayford, supra note 10, at 126; see also 2 LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 39:8 (2002) ("[C]ourts generally apply the following two part test in determining if
the award should be vacated for manifest disregard of the law: (1) Did the arbitrator know of the
governing legal principal yet refused to apply it or ignored it all together? and (2) Was the law
ignored by the arbitrators well defined, explicit and clearly applicable to the case.").
106. Hayford, supra note 10, at 127; see also Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation ofArbitration
Proceedings: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 509, 562 (2008) (explaining that two potential applications of the manifest-disregard
standard are (1) to police outlying awards and (2) to overturn awards that materially vary from
judicial results).
107. Hayford, supra note 10, at 127 (citing Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard
Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1997); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10
(1st Cir. 1990)).
108. Id. at 127-28.
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statement that awards should not be reviewed for "error in
interpretation."' 09
The third application falls somewhere between the first two and is
known as the "presumption-based" approach.11o Under this approach the
court reviews the record of the arbitration proceedings and will overturn
the award if something in that record creates a presumption that the
arbitrator ignored known, applicable law."' For example, the Eleventh
Circuit once overturned an award under the manifest-disregard standard
because it disagreed with the arbitrator's legal conclusion and because
the prevailing party at the arbitration had "flagrantly and blatantly urged"
the arbitrator to ignore the controlling law.112 With no written opinion,
this was the only available evidence that the arbitrator consciously
disregarded the law, but the court thought it was enough to overturn the
award." 3 So, like the futility-acknowledged approach, the presumption-
based approach requires some, albeit limited, proof that the arbitrator
knew the law and chose to ignore it. Yet, like the big-error approach, it
allows the court to overturn an award without direct proof that the
arbitrator made a conscious decision to ignore the law.114
All three approaches show that the doctrine is malleable, giving
courts flexibility in using it to balance arbitration's efficiency policy
against their desire for accurate awards."' But the three approaches also
show courts' disagreement over what the appropriate balance between
efficiency and accuracy should be." 6 Courts applying the narrow
standard are enforcing arbitration's limited-review principle, which is
based on arbitration's efficiency policy. Courts applying the broader
standard find inaccurate awards fundamentally unfair. Neither of these
extremes is correct when applied uniformly to all types of arbitration; the
emphasis placed on efficiency or accuracy should depend on the type of
arbitration involved.
109. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
110. Hayford, supra note 10, at 128-32 (citing Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d
1456 (11 th Cir. 1997); Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998)).
111. Id. at 129-30 ("The framework for analysis under this third model works backwards from
an arbitral outcome the reviewing court believes to be flawed as a matter of law, confirmed by an
exhaustive evaluation of the factual record made in arbitration.").
112. Monies, 128 F.3dat 1461.
113. Id. at 1461-62; Hayford, supra note 10, at 129.
114. See Hayford, supra note 10, at 125-32 (comparing all three approaches).
115. Scodro, supra note 94, at 571.
116. See id. at 571-72 (discussing "modern doctrinal inconsistencies" resulting from judicial
attempts at balancing).
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The Supreme Court, however, apparently disagrees. For example, it
has consistently said that arbitration awards should not be reviewed for
legal error.1 7  The Court's intent, undoubtedly, has been to promote
arbitration's efficiency policy. But the uniform application of this "no
legal error" rule to all arbitrations fails to recognize that not all
arbitrations are alike. And it excessively limits other courts' abilities to
overturn awards under the manifest-disregard standard in mandatory
arbitrations. Thus, it exhibits the contradiction between arbitration's
goal of accurate awards and the absence of any meaningful judicial
review to achieve that goal." 8
B. Manifest Disregard, Legal Error, and the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court substantively addressed manifest disregard for
the first time in 2008 in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.,' and its
decision created some confusion over the doctrine's scope and continued
existence. The Court granted certiorari in Hall Street to resolve a circuit
split over whether parties can contractually expand the grounds for
vacatur under the FAA, not to address manifest disregard.o20  But one
passage in Hall Street addressed manifest disregard's origins, and it
expressed-albeit not in great detail-the Court's limited view of how
lower courts should apply the doctrine.' 2' To explain this passage, a
brief aside on the case itself is necessary.
Hall Street sued Mattel in federal court over two issues: (1) whether
Mattel had complied with applicable environmental laws during the term
of the parties' lease and (2) whether Mattel properly terminated that
lease.12 2  But during the course of the litigation, the parties agreed to
117. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. In addition to the Wilko Court's statement
regarding no judicial review for "error in interpretation," also see Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (stating that "serious error" by the arbitrator does not
warrant vacating an award).
118. Poser, supra note 33, at 504-05 ("The judicially created 'manifest disregard' ground for
vacatur represents an attempt by the federal courts to resolve the inherent contradiction between the
goal that arbitrators faithfully and accurately apply the law and the absence of meaningful judicial
review to enforce this goal.").
119. 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
120. Id. at 578. The question presented in the petition for certiorari was whether "the Federal
Arbitration Act ('FAA') precludes a federal court from enforcing the parties' clearly expressed
agreement providing for more expansive judicial review of an arbitration award than the narrow
standard of review otherwise provided for in the FAA[.]" Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Hall
St., 552 U.S. 576 (No. 06-989) 2007 WL 128611.
121. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 584-85.
122. Id. at 579.
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arbitrate their disagreement over Mattel's environmental compliance.12 3
The agreement stated that the district court-the same court that was
hearing the lease-termination dispute-could vacate or modify the
arbitrator's award if the arbitrator's conclusions of law were
"erroneous." 24 This, of course, is not one of the statutory grounds for
vacatur under the FAA. 125  So, by contracting for review of legal error,
the parties had attempted to contractually expand the court's ability to
vacate awards.126
When the arbitrator ruled in favor of Mattel, Hall Street appealed the
ruling to the district court, which overturned the award (based on legal
error) and remanded to the arbitrator for further consideration.12 7 Then,
after the arbitrator ruled in favor of Hall Street on remand, both parties
sought to modify the award. 128 The district court, however, allowed it to
stand.129  Each party then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, where Mattel
argued for the first time that the district court erred when it reviewed the
arbitrator's award for legal error.130 Citing a recent Ninth Circuit en banc
opinion, Mattel argued that the arbitration provision was
unenforceable.' 3' The Ninth Circuit ultimately agreed. 32  Hall Street
then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which the
Court granted to "decide whether the grounds for vacatur and
modification provided by §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA are exclusive." 33
In appealing the Ninth Circuit's decision, Hall Street made two
arguments. First, it argued that the provision allowing review for legal
error was valid because arbitration is a "creature of contract." 3 4  The
123. Id
124. Id.
125. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006) (stating that a court may vacate an arbitration award where (1)
the winning party procured the award by corruption or fraud, (2) the arbitrators were biased or
corrupt, (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct, or (4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers).
126. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 579.
127. Id. at 580.
12 8. Id
129. Id. The district court did modify the arbitrator's interest calculation, but that was the only
change made. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id
132. Id. at 581.
133. Id. The Court's use of the term "exclusive" is what has created much of the controversy
surrounding manifest disregard because some courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have interpreted
that language to mean that nonstatutory grounds for vacatur no longer exist. Aragaki, supra note 94,
at 3-4. As I explain in note 140, I disagree with that interpretation.
134. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 585.
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Court found this argument insufficient.s35  More importantly, Hall
Street's second argument was "that expandable judicial review authority
has been accepted as the law since Wilko v. Swan."'16  The Court
ultimately dismissed this argument as well, saying that although Wilko
"includes some language arguably favoring Hall Street's position,
arguable is as far as it goes."' 37
In discussing the latter argument, the Court quoted Wilko's manifest-
disregard statement and mentioned that Hall Street interpreted this
statement as allowing parties to contract for expanded judicial review.138
Disagreeing with Hall Street's interpretation, the Court pointed out that
manifest disregard is a judicially created ground for vacatur and that
parties cannot expand the grounds for judicial review just because judges
can.' 39  The Court then said that the Wilko statement "expressly rejects
just what Hall Street asks for here, general review for an arbitrator's
legal errors."140 But that was the extent of the Court's attempt to define
135. Id at 586 ("[W]e think the argument comes up short."). More specifically, the Court agreed
that parties are free to contract regarding issues like choice of arbitrator or choice of substantive law;
however, it said that the text of the FAA compels a finding that the grounds in §§ 10 (for vacatur)
and 11 (for modification) are exclusive. Id.
136. Id. at 584.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 584-85.
139. Id. at 585. The Court did not explain this argument very well, as it failed to explicitly
explain that manifest disregard is a judicially created ground for vacatur. Rather, it left this fact
implied in its following statement: "Hall Street sees this supposed addition to § 10 as the camel's
nose: ifjudges can add grounds to vacate (or modify), so can contracting parties." Id.
140. Id. at 585. The Court also added to the confusion over the foundation of the doctrine.
Specifically, the Court called Wilko's manifest-disregard statement "vague" and then it said: "Maybe
the term 'manifest-disregard' was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it merely
referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to them. Or, as some courts have
thought, 'manifest-disregard' may have been shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4)...." Id
(citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit has interpreted Holl Street as eliminating manifest disregard as
a ground for vacating awards under the FAA. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d
349 (5th Cir. 2009). The Eleventh Circuit followed suit in 2010. Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604
F.3d 1313, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010). The Second and Ninth Circuits have determined that manifest
disregard still stands as a ground for vacatur under the FAA. See Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds
Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); Comedy
Club, Inc. v, Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court was expected
to clarify the continued existence of the doctrine when it issued its opinion in the appeal of the
Second Circuit's decision in Stoh-Nielsen, but the Court expressed no opinion on "whether 'manifest
disregard' survives." See 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3.
I don't believe Hall Street eliminated manifest disregard. Rather, like Professor Aragaki, I
believe that Hall Street simply prohibits parties from contractually expanding judicial review. See
Aragaki, supra note 94, at 5 (arguing that courts should interpret the holding of Hall Street- that
the statutory grounds for vacatur are exclusive-to simply mean that parties cannot expand the
grounds for vacatur by contract). But even if the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and other elimination
theorists are correct in stating that, after Hall Street, manifest disregard no longer exists as a ground
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manifest disregard; it gave no other indication of the scope of the
doctrine.' 4' Thus, the Court simply noted what manifest disregard does
not mean, not what it does.1 42
The reason for the Court's minimalist approach is unclear. Maybe it
failed to define the scope of the doctrine because that was the only way
to gamer a majority vote. 14 3 Or maybe it avoided the issue because the
right to contractual expansion was the actual issue raised by the
parties.'" Regardless, the Court's statement that manifest disregard does
not include review for legal error is out there, and it appears to be
consistent with what the Wilko Court intended manifest disregard to
mean.145  But that does not mean it is correct or that the statement is
broad enough to preclude review for legal error in all types of
arbitration. 146  In fact, the Court's manifest-disregard jurisprudence may
for vacatur and even if Congress fails to codify manifest disregard any time in the near future, state
courts will still have the opportunity to redefine the doctrine, as some states have adopted manifest
disregard as a ground for vacatur under their state arbitration acts. See infra note 150. In fact, state
courts may be a good testing ground for my proposal to see how efficiently it works. See Huber,
supra note 106, at 563 ("In the absence of agreement about what is desired from the concept of
manifest disregard of the law, whether under that name or an alternative rubric, no good answer is
available. This is a situation tailor-made for state law experimentation.").
141, The Court subsequently granted the petition for certiorari in a case out of the Ninth Circuit
where the lower court had overturned an arbitration award under the manifest-disregard standard.
See Improv W. Assocs. v. Comedy Club, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 45, 45 (2008). But it did not take the
opportunity to clarify manifest disregard in that case. Id. Instead it simply remanded to the Ninth
Circuit with instructions to reconsider the decision in light of Hall Street. Id On remand, the Ninth
Circuit found that Hall Street had no effect on its decision because it already considered manifest
disregard part of the statutory grounds for vacatur under the FAA. Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W.
Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009).
142. See Hall St., 552 U.S. at 585-86 (discussing manifest disregard).
143. Robert Ellis, Imperfect Minimalism: Unanswered Questions in Hall Street Associates,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008), 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1187, 1192 (2009) ("It is
conceivable that the Court refused to define manifest disregard in order to ensure the broadest
possible agreement for its decision.").
144. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 6, 6
(1996) ("Frequently judges decide no more than they have to decide. They leave things open. They
make deliberate decisions about what should be left unsaid. This practice is pervasive: doing and
saying as little as necessary to justify an outcome.").
145. The Wilko Court also said that awards should not be reviewed for legal error. Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). And the sources cited by the Court in support of
its original "manifest disregard" statement actually conflict with the doctrine as it exists today. See
Scodro, supra note 94, at 581-86 (stating that the sources cited in Wilko supported vacating an
award "when the arbitrator manifested an intention to adhere to the law but erred in executing this
intention, not when the arbitrator consciously disregarded legal rules, as the modem 'manifest
disregard' standard allows.").
146. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 3 (2009) ("[Wlhen a minimalist court establishes a narrow legal rule to govern its own case, it
leaves other courts in other cases free to make their own rules of law.").
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be vague enough for future courts to step around the "no legal error"
limitation, at least in noncommercial arbitrations.147 Part III explains
why they should do so.
IV. CREATING A NEW CASE-CENTRIC MODEL FOR APPLYING MANIFEST
DISREGARD
Given the Supreme Court's failure to clarify manifest disregard's
scope in Hall Street, the doctrine still has at least four significant flaws,
all of which impact mandatory arbitration's procedural justice. First, as
previously mentioned, it has no firm basis in law. The Supreme Court
created the doctrine in dicta in a case that it subsequently overturned,14 8
and it expressed uncertainty over the doctrinal foundation in Hall
Street.'49 Although this is a significant flaw, it has been amply addressed
elsewhere in the literature.1s0 For now, I will focus on the other three,
which are (1) that the doctrine remains largely undefined, (2) that the
definition we have is too limited, and (3) that courts apply the doctrine
uniformly regardless of the nature of the arbitration. Then, after
explaining the nature and effects of the flaws in the current doctrine, I
propose a new method for applying it-one that allows courts to review
awards for legal error in mandatory arbitrations. This new case-centric
method will make mandatory arbitration more palatable by enhancing
procedural justice for the parties forced into it. And it will move us
toward recognizing that not all arbitrations should be treated alike.
147. Because Hall Street involved two commercial parties, you could read its statement on legal
error and manifest disregard in that context and decide that the statement applies only to commercial
arbitrations. Admittedly, however, you could also read it as a blanket statement precluding review
for legal error in all arbitrations, and you could cite Wilko in support of such a reading-because
Wilko was not a commercial arbitration and because it also said awards could not be reviewed for
legal error. But, as I explain in Part IV, it makes more sense to allow review for legal error in
mandatory arbitrations and to not allow review for legal error in commercial arbitrations.
148. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37.
149. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008); see also supra note 140.
150. Christopher Drahozal recently published a well-reasoned piece on this topic suggesting that
Congress should codify manifest disregard as a ground for vacatur under the FAA-I recommend it
if you wish to read more about that specific problem. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying
Manifest Disregard, 8 NEv. L.J. 234, 235 (2007) ("Without manifest disregard review, a court may
face the prospect of having to confirm an arbitration award in which the arbitrators on the face of the
award blatantly refuse to apply clearly applicable law."). However, I should note that I disagree
with the limited nature of the manifest-disregard standard that Drahozal supports. On a related note,
at least one state arbitration act recognizes manifest disregard as a statutory ground for vacatur. The
Georgia General Assembly codified manifest disregard as a ground for vacatur under Georgia's
arbitration act in 2003. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13(b)(5) (West Supp. 2009).
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A. The Doctrine Remains Largely Undefined
Manifest disregard's meaning still is unclear. When the Supreme
Court mentioned manifest disregard in Wilko, it did so with little
explanation of what the phrase meant.'' And the Court didn't elaborate
on how to interpret that phrase until issuing its opinion in Hall Street
more than fifty years later.15 2  Even then, the Court took a minimalist
approach to addressing the doctrine by telling us what manifest disregard
does not mean instead of what it does.'5 3 Specifically, the Court said that
the doctrine does not allow courts to review awards for legal error; it
failed, however, to otherwise explain the doctrine's scope. 5 4  So it
remains undefined, which is why lower courts have been free over the
last fifty years to create their own definitions.'" This is, at least in part,
why parties have relied on manifest disregard so frequently over the last
half century when attempting to overturn arbitration awards. 56
This lack of definition means that we will continue to have no
uniform standard across jurisdictions for applying the doctrine. As a
result, parties will be subject to different standards based on the
jurisdiction in which their arbitration takes place.' This may lead to
forum shopping by parties sophisticated enough to include the more
favorable jurisdictions in their forum-selection clauses.158 Moreover, it
diminishes perceptions of procedural justice in arbitration because parties
prefer defined procedures. 5 Specifically, even if manifest disregard has
151. 346 U.S. at 436-37 ("In unrestricted submissions,. .. the interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review
for error in interpretation.").
152. 552 U.S. at 584-85.
153. See Ellis, supra note 143, at 1192 (discussing the minimalist approach of the Hfall Street
majority).
154. Hal/St., 552 U.S. at 584-85.
155. Scodro, supra note 94, at 567.
156. LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 10, at 203-05 ("Inconsistent approaches over the manifest
disregard standard appear to spur the surprising popularity of this basis for challenging awards.").
157. Hayford, supra note 10, at 125-26 (summarizing different manifest-disregard standards
currently applied by various courts).
158. Those parties, for example, might avoid forums within the Second Circuit, which currently
seems more inclined than most other circuits to review awards for legal error. See, e.g., Willemijn
Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir 1997) ("[Al
court may infer that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law if it finds that the error made by
the arbitrators is so obvious that it would be instantly perceived by the average person qualified to
serve as an arbitrator.").
159. Shestowsky, supra note 81, at 236, 241-42 (finding through three experiments that parties
prefer rules that are pre-established).
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a set meaning in each jurisdiction, when parties fight over the appropriate
jurisdiction, it is unclear which manifest-disregard doctrine will apply.160
Finally, the lack of definition is troublesome because it has persisted
for so long. More than fifty years have passed since the Supreme Court
created manifest disregard in 1953. So, for more than fifty years, parties
have been fighting over the meaning of this standard. And the Supreme
Court's recent decision addressing manifest disregard will only increase
the number of disputes involving the doctrine.161 Perhaps finally
defining it will reduce the use of resources necessary to resolve these
disputes and will improve parties' perceptions of mandatory arbitration's
procedural fairness.
B. Not All Arbitrations Are Alike
Arbitration is designed to be an efficient process-limited discovery,
limited rules of evidence, and limited review of awards." 2 But its
emphasis on efficiency should not remain constant for all types of
arbitration.163 The simple reason is that not all arbitrations are alike.
Mandatory arbitration, for example, is a recent phenomenon-a result of
the Supreme Court's "national policy favoring arbitration"
jurisprudence.'6 It involves commercial parties who use their superior
bargaining power to contractually bind consumers, employees,
franchisees, patients, and others to resolve disputes outside of court.6 s
160. See John W. Hinchey & Thomas V. Burch, The Effect of Forum-Selection Clauses on a
District Court's Power to Compel Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2005-Jan. 2006, at 55, 55
(explaining the difficulties that arise when a party files a motion to compel in a jurisdiction outside
the one called for in the applicable forum selection clause).
161. See Aragaki, supra note 94, at 1-2 (noting that state or federal courts, in the year following
Hall Street, faced decisions on manifest disregard on average once a week).
162. See Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial
Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REv. 731, 740 (1996) (stating that parties who agree to arbitrate trade
procedures and judicial review for simplicity and expediency); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration:
The "New Litigation ", 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 4 ("Conventional wisdom suggests that businesses
choose binding arbitration mainly because it is perceived to be different from litigation. Parties look
for some or all of the following: cost savings, shorter resolution times, a more satisfactory process,
expert decision makers, privacy and confidentiality, and relative finality.").
163. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO
ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 759, 780 (2001) (calling for "separate arbitration acts--one designed to offer
procedural protections to one-shot players and the other to protect the integrity of the traditional
arbitral process"); see also BRUNET ET AL., supra note 75, at 3 (stating that "policies relating to
expertise, efficiency, and finality are often trumped by higher order principles that support
arbitration").
164. Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1636.
165. See id. at 1638-39.
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There is no bilateral consent.' 66  In fact, sometimes commercial parties
are able to bind others to arbitration without having them sign an
arbitration agreement.'6 7  The purpose is to lock them into a less formal
method of adjudicating disputes where they have little chance of
challenging a legally inaccurate award and where the commercial parties
have repeat player advantages.
Purely commercial arbitrations, on the other hand, have a much
longer history and involve parties with relatively equal bargaining power
that freely agree to arbitrate their claims.'69  The parties make an
economic decision to forego the more involved, time-consuming
litigation process because they value the potential efficiency of
arbitration.o70  Efficiency is more important in this context than whether
any given award is accurate. Inaccurate awards balance out over time
because of these parties' repeat player status.t 7 1
Congress intended the FAA to cover purely commercial
arbitrations,17 2 as it did not want arbitration agreements to be "offered on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or employees."' 73 It based
166. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 75, at 6-7 ("Bilateral consent to arbitrate is essential to
autonomy and to freedom. If only one party wants arbitration, the other party loses control.");
Reuben, supra note 47, at 282 (stating that involuntary arbitration "frustrates the larger goals of
democratic governance").
167. Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1640 ("Thus, companies often impose arbitration on their
consumers by including an arbitration agreement in a document that is received by the consumer but
not necessarily read and certainly not signed.").
168. Id. at 1650-51 ("Whereas a given company will tend to arbitrate many consumer disputes, a
given consumer or employee will typically arbitrate, at most, one. Thus, the companies have far
greater experience with and exposure to the arbitration process than do the consumers or
employees.").
169. See id. at 1635 (discussing how businesses have traditionally used arbitration to settle
disputes); Cole, supra note 163, at 773 (discussing the dynamics of arbitration agreements between
repeat players).
170. Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1635. Businesses also look for privacy and arbitrator expertise.
Id
171. Cole, supra note 163, at 775 ("Moreover, for repeat players, it is irrelevant that errors may
occur in determining the outcome of a particular dispute, as long as no systematic bias presents
itself. Repeat players are aware that outcomes should balance out over the long term.").
172. For example, during a floor debate on the FAA the Chairman of the House Committee on
the Judiciary said: "This bill simply provides for one thing, and that is to give an opportunity to
enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty contracts-an agreement to arbitrate,
when voluntarily placed in the document by the parties to it." 65 CoNG. REC. 1931 (1924); see also
Bills to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for Arbitration of Disputes
Arising out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions, or Commerce Among the States or Territories or
with Foreign Nations: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms.
on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 14-15 (1924) (statements of Sen. Sterling, Chairman, Subcomm. of the
Comm. on the Judiciary and Julius H. Cohen, General Counsel, New York State Chamber of
Commerce) (addressing concerns over take-it-or-leave-it arbitration agreements).
173. Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1636 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
HeinOnline  -- 59 U. Kan. L. Rev. 72 2010-2011
2010] IMPERFECT PROCEDURAL JUSTICE OF ARBITRATION
its reasoning on the fairness principle. Specifically, when parties enter
into an arbitration agreement, the agreement's fairness is assessed in one
of two ways: looking at the conditions underlying the agreement's
formation or looking at the substantive fairness of the agreement itself.74
Under either view, the parties who are subjected to mandatory arbitration
do not receive a fair exchange. They have little choice in deciding
whether to accept the arbitration clause-if they even know it is in their
agreement-and the agreement itself is drafted to favor the commercial
party.s75  Congress recognized the potential inequity of allowing
mandatory arbitration under these circumstances, which is why it
intended the FAA to apply to commercial arbitrations.17 6
So far, courts have failed to fully recognize Congress's intent and,
more generally, have failed to recognize that not all arbitrations should
be treated alike.'7 7  For example, regardless of what manifest-disregard
standard a particular jurisdiction chooses to apply, it applies that standard
uniformly to all arbitrations.178 So courts within that jurisdiction apply
the same standard to mandatory arbitrations and commercial arbitrations
alike.' 79  This one-size-fits-all approach to the manifest-disregard
standard is a mistake.'" It either tends to promote efficiency at the
388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting)). In Prima Paint, Justice Black said: "The members
of Congress revealed an acute awareness of this problem. On several occasions they expressed
opposition to a law which would enforce even a valid arbitration provision contained in a contract
between parties of unequal bargaining power." 388 U.S. at 414.
174. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 106 (2d ed. 1998).
t75. See Cole, supra note 163, at 768-70.
176. See Stemlight, supra note 5, at 1636; see also Cole, supra note 163, at 764 n.21 (describing
statements made in the floor debate before the vote on the FAA indicating that Congress intended
the FAA to apply to commercial disputes).
177. This is a byproduct of the Supreme Court's national policy favoring arbitration and its
steady expansion of claims that parties may be forced to arbitrate.
178. See Cole, supra note 163, at 759.
179. The term "mandatory arbitration" is somewhat controversial, as some arbitration scholars
believe it unfairly characterizes arbitration agreements signed by consumers, employees, or
franchisees. See Sternlight, supra note 5, at 1632 n.1 (citing authors who disagree with the
nomenclature). I previously defined mandatory arbitration as, among other things, any arbitration
where a party, including a commercial party, with grossly unequal bargaining power is required
through contract to arbitrate a dispute. See supra note 3. 1 admit that this definition seems
troublesome in terms of the proposal I make in this paper on at least two counts. First, determining
whether unequal bargaining power exists will require a fact-based inquiry by the court reviewing the
arbitration award, which will increase the expense of the arbitration. Second, including commercial
parties within this definition will present situations where such a party, even though it has unequal
bargaining power, may be sophisticated enough to make an informed economic decision regarding
whether to sign the arbitration agreement. Nevertheless, the definition I provide should work in the
mandatory-arbitration context.
180. See Cole, supra note 163, at 759 (arguing that it is a mistake to treat arbitration as a "one
size fits all dispute resolution mechanism"); Stipanowich, supra note 162, at 39 n.289 ("One-size-
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expense of parties who had little choice in deciding whether to arbitrate
their claims, or it increases costs for parties who chose arbitration
intending it to be an efficient way to resolve disputes. 18' Thus, it fails to
recognize that parties forced into arbitration may want, and deserve,
greater procedural protections than commercial parties who made an
economic decision to arbitrate. 182
Courts should place more emphasis on accuracy in mandatory
arbitration by expanding manifest disregard to cover situations where
arbitrators make a legal error-whether intentional or not. The narrow
definition that most courts currently apply excessively limits judges'
ability to correct arbitrators' mistakes. 83  This means that parties
subjected to mandatory arbitration have no control over correcting an
award when an arbitrator unintentionally disregards the law, which is
particularly troublesome given that arbitrators often fail to follow the
law.' 84 The procedural justice literature shows that parties like decision
control; in particular, parties want the ability to appeal arbitrators'
decisions.'" Mandatory arbitration seems like the ideal context to
experiment with giving parties that control, particularly given the recent
public campaigns against mandatory arbitration that have focused on
arbitration's limited-review principle.'" Consequently, it is time to
redefine manifest disregard to give more control to parties subjected to
mandatory arbitration.
fits-all approaches [to arbitration] are outmoded and intrinsically problematic." (quoting Thomas
Stipanowich, Future Lies Down a Number of Divergent Paths, DIsP. RESOL. MAO., Spring 2000, at
16, 16)).
181. See Stipanowich, supra note 162, at 38-39; see also Huber, supra note 106, at 562
("Applying a single standard of legal review to all arbitration awards seems to provide too much
review in some instances, but too little review in others [sic] instances.").
182. Treating all arbitrations alike may also tend to harm commercial arbitration in this sense:
given the recent push against mandatory arbitration, overreaching reform proposals that do not
differentiate between mandatory and commercial arbitrations may unnecessarily carry over to the
commercial realm. See Stipanowich, supra note 162, at 40 ("In another of the ironic twists that
permeate the history of modem arbitration, pro-arbitration policy and classic contract theory
combined to bring standardized employment and consumer agreements alongside commercial
agreements for enforcement purposes, provoking responses that sometimes carry over into the
commercial realm."); see also Cole, supra note 163, at 759 ("Proponents of a unified approach to
arbitration fail to recognize that increasing process to protect employees and consumers may impose
burdens on other groups, such as merchants, where those burdens are not warranted.").
183. The narrow definition "nullifies" the doctrine. See Hayford, supra note 10, at 126.
184. Stephen J. Ware, "Opt-In" for Judicial Review of Errors of Law Under the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 263, 263 (1997) ("[Alrbitrators often do not apply
the law."). But see Drahozal, supra note 9, at 190 (stating that empirical evidence doesn't support
the idea that arbitration is "lawless").
185. See Folger, supra note 40, at 63-69 (summarizing studies showing that giving parties
decision control through appeal mechanisms enhances procedural justice).
186. See sources cited supra notes 5, I1.
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C. A Case-Centric Method for Applying Manifest Disregard
Around the time the Supreme Court announced its "national policy
favoring arbitration" in 1984,'g it began expanding the scope of
arbitrable claims to include public-law disputes that previously were off-
limits to arbitration.' 88  Now virtually all claims are arbitrable, which
allows parties to "privatize" public law and transform mandatory rules to
default rules by requiring arbitration of their disputes.'" Andrew
Guzman has criticized the expansion because allowing parties to contract
around mandatory rules inappropriately externalizes costs, reduces social
welfare, and circumvents the will of Congress.190 And Stephen Ware has
suggested expanding protections against erroneous arbitration awards by
requiring de novo review of all arbitration decisions involving mandatory
rules. 191 I agree with Guzman's criticisms, and Ware's suggestion would
work well in commercial arbitrations-for instance, antitrust disputes.
But in mandatory arbitration, the procedural protections should expand
even further, giving parties who have not truly consented to arbitration
more outcome control.
Specifically, courts should review all awards in mandatory
arbitration for legal error under the manifest-disregard standard-
regardless of whether those awards involve mandatory rules or default
rules. This allows courts to review awards based on the parties involved,
not on whether mandatory or default rules are at stake. In other words,
courts would examine the parties' relationship to determine whether this
expanded standard would apply. Based on how I previously defined
mandatory arbitration,192  the expanded standard would apply to
employment disputes, consumer disputes, franchisee disputes, civil rights
187. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
188. Ware, supra note 59, at 712-19. These previously inarbitrable claims included claims
under RICO, ERISA, Title VII, and ADEA, among others. Id. at 714.
189. Id. at 705-07, 715. Ware defines default rules as "those government-created rights and
duties that are privatizable, rules that govern unless the parties contract out of them." Id at 706. He
defines mandatory rules as "those government-created rights and duties that cannot be avoided by
contract, those that are not privatizable." Id.
190. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory
Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1285, 1298 (2000) ("Arbitration, coupled with limited judicial review,
frustrates the intent of lawmakers to make certain legal rules mandatory."),
191. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 59, at 704 ("The [Supreme) Court must either reverse its
decisions that claims arising under otherwise mandatory rules are arbitrable, or require de novo
judicial review of arbitrator's legal rulings on such claims."). As an alternative, Andrew Guzman
suggested that parties should be able to sue arbitrators who fail to apply mandatory rules. See
Guzman, supra note 190, at 1283.
192. See supra note 3.
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disputes, and disputes where the parties have grossly unequal bargaining
power.'93  The narrow standard that most courts currently apply would
still apply to purely commercial arbitrations.
Parties may still contract around default rules under my proposal,
and arbitrators would have to apply the contractual terms with their
applications being reviewed for legal error-that is, the arbitrator must
apply the parties' private law.'94 This preserves some power to the party
drafting the arbitration agreement because it can draft around default
rules that would otherwise apply. While this would allow commercial
parties to contract around rules that may benefit consumers, employees,
and others who are subjected to mandatory arbitration, any attempt to
contract around default rules would be reviewed under the
unconscionability standard, meaning that the drafting party cannot abuse
its power. 95 Also, courts should not allow parties to contract around the
right to confirm, vacate, or modify an award, nor should they allow
parties to contractually eliminate the reviewing court's ability to award
costs or fees.' 96 This would prevent the drafting party from contractually
avoiding the rule proposed here. Finally, arbitrators would be obligated
to apply default rules that parties have not contracted around. Any
failure to apply those rules would be subject to review for legal error,
thus increasing parties' ability to rely on a prescribed set of rules.
These changes would protect parties subjected to mandatory
arbitration from corporate overreaching and give them the opportunity to
correct arbitrators' mistakes. In other words, the changes would increase
decision control, thus enhancing procedural justice.197 The changes also
are justified given the recent push against mandatory arbitration.198
193. This is similar to the standard found in some of the recent legislation seeking to prohibit
mandatory arbitration altogether. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 11Oth
Cong. §§ 3(5), 3(6), 4(4)(b) (1st Sess. 2007). The only difference is that I would have courts apply
the catch-all "unequal bargaining power" provision only in cases of grossly unequal bargaining
power.
194. This admittedly goes against the Supreme Court's admonishment that courts should not
review arbitrators' contractual interpretations for error. See Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v.
Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509-10 (2001).
195. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996) ("[Tlhe text of§ 2 declares
that state law may be applied 'if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability,
and enforceability of contracts generally.' Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as
fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without
contravening § 2." (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987))).
196. This is similar to the rule under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act. See UNIF. ARB. ACT
§ 4 (2000).
197. Folger, supra note 40, at 68 ("On balance, it seems warranted to conclude that direct
outcome control enhances procedural justice.").
198. See sources cited supra note 5.
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Specifically, consider how public sentiment against mandatory
arbitration has continued to grow over the last twenty years. Consumers,
employees, franchisees, patients, and others who are subjected to
mandatory arbitration are increasingly arguing that it is not fair to require
resolution of their claims in a forum where little, if any, chance for error
correction exists.'99 They have even convinced some members of
Congress to support an outright ban on mandatory arbitration.200
Because the procedural-justice literature shows us that parties' subjective
viewpoints matter, those viewpoints should influence the design of an
appropriate manifest-disregard standard. 20 1 The standard proposed here
considers those viewpoints.
Multiple possible objections to this proposal exist. For example,
some might think that it inhibits freedom of contract. 202 Parties generally
sign arbitration agreements because they want to avoid the formal
litigation process, and allowing review for legal error in mandatory
arbitration makes it more likely that parties will nevertheless have to
litigate their claims in court.20 3 Consequently, my proposed change also
goes against the supposed "essential feature" of arbitration-finality.m
Businesses might be less inclined to include arbitration clauses in their
standardized contracts if consumers, employees, and others who are
forced into arbitration have greater rights to appeal.205 Such a change
199. See sources cited supra note 11.
200. See sources cited supra note 5; see also Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1997, S.
63, 105th Cong. (Ist Sess. 1997) (calling for a prohibition on mandatory arbitration for civil rights
claims).
201. See Shestowsky & Brett, supra note 37, at 71.
202. Stemlight, supra note 5, at 1634 ("Some of these defenders (of mandatory arbitration] also
assert that voiding the contract would deny consumersfemployees their freedom of contract." (citing
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Under Assault: Trial Lawyers Lead the Charge, POL'Y ANALYSIS,
April 18, 2002, at 1, 8, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa433.pdf)); see also Paul F.
Kirgis, The Contractarian Model ofArbitration and Its Implications for Judicial Review ofArbitral
Awards, 85 OR. L. REv. 1, 5 (2006) ("Courts venerate party autonomy. They tend to see extreme
deference to arbitral awards as necessary to protect the parties' choice of arbitration as an alternative
to adjudication.").
203. See Kirgis, supra note 202, at 2 ("The disputants who favor arbitration are not necessarily
averse to law and legal solutions, and they typically embrace lawyers as dispute resolution
professionals. What they often want to avoid is the formality of traditional adjudicative process.").
204. See Hayford, supra note 10, at 118 (stating that finality is the "essential feature" of
arbitration). But see BRUNET ET AL., supra note 75, at 18 ("The case for efficiency as a paramount
value underlying arbitration is tepid at best.").
205. See generally Cole, supra note 163, at 764-67, 770 (discussing the reasons arbitration is
attractive to employers); Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration
Agreements-with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB.
251, 254-64 (2006) (arguing that adhesive agreements benefit society by, among other things,
reducing costs).
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could also have negative effects for those forced into arbitration.
Namely, if they win, and if the appeal-for-legal-error rule applies to all
parties, then the commercial parties could freely appeal, thereby
increasing the expense of litigating the claim.206 Finally, arbitrators
usually do not issue reasoned opinions, and the lack of reasoned opinions
makes it more difficult for reviewing courts to determine whether the
arbitrator made a legal error.20 7 Thus, the lack of reasoned opinions
would inhibit the effectiveness of my proposal.208
These are all valid, debatable points. But none is compelling enough
to avoid recognizing that courts should review awards in mandatory
arbitration under a different standard or that parties subjected to
mandatory arbitration deserve greater procedural rights.209 Specifically,
the ex ante freedom of contract argument carries little weight because
parties who are asked to sign arbitration agreements often fail to read
them and, even if they did, they would have little power to negotiate
terms.21 o In other words, they usually have not given informed consent
and therefore have not freely contracted to arbitrate. 211 Also, the notion
of finality in arbitration is overblown. Finality should be a concern only
if the parties intended the arbitration to be final-an idea premised on
party autonomy. When one of the parties does not give informed consent
to arbitrate, that party cannot have intended arbitration as the final forum
for resolving a dispute.2 12 Additionally, whether businesses will avoid
including mandatory-arbitration clauses in their agreements gives me
little concern. Businesses will base their decisions on a cost-benefit
analysis. If mandatory arbitration's benefits still outweigh its costs,
which they probably will, then businesses will continue using it. If not,
206. Kirgis, supra note 202, at 54.
207. Hayford, supra note 10, at 125-26; Hans Smit, Mandatory Law in Arbitration, IS AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 155, 168 (2007) (noting that a preference for nonreasoned awards "renders judicial
review more difficult").
208. But it would not eliminate the effectiveness of my proposal. See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray,
Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202-04 (2d Cir. 1998) (overturning an award under the manifest-disregard
standard without the benefit of a reasoned award); Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d
1456, 1459-62 (11th Cir. 1997) (same).
209. See Cole, supra note 163, at 789 (calling for amendments to the FAA "to protect one-shot
players from potential abuses by repeat players"); Kirgis, supra note 202, at 5-6 ("At the end of the
day, every policy argument in favor of arbitration without judicial review can be met by a contrary
argument in favor of curtailing arbitration.").
210. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
211. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 75, at 7 ("A consumer who is forced to arbitrate a dispute
without having knowledgeably consented to arbitration loses both the freedom to use the court
system and the freedom to contract in a knowing fashion.").
212. Id. at 23-24.
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they won't.213 Either way, my proposal avoids the harsher sanction of
eliminating mandatory arbitration altogether, which would take the
decision of whether to arbitrate completely out of businesses' hands.
Nevertheless, in deference to some of the concerns with my basic
proposal, consider the following additional tweaks. First, courts should
sanction parties for frivolous appeals that rely on the manifest-disregard
standard. Ideally, the possibility of sanctions would appear in section 10
of the FAA after manifest disregard is codified, if Congress codifies the
doctrine.214  This would give courts additional textual justification for
sanctioning parties who file frivolous appeals. 215  Alternatively, courts
could use their inherent powers over the litigation process to sanction
parties who improperly rely on manifest disregard.216  The Eleventh
213. One potential critique here is that I seem to believe that businesses can perform cost-benefit
analyses but consumers, employees, or franchisees cannot. My response to this is twofold. First,
businesses have better information. They are repeat players, they know what the arbitration
agreement says, they know the effects of the arbitration agreement, and they know the costs of
arbitration. Consumers, employees, and franchisees usually have none of these advantages. Also,
consumers, employees, and franchisees often do not have the luxury of performing a cost-benefit
analysis. If they need a certain product and all sellers of that product require arbitration, if they need
a certain job and all employers offering that job require arbitration, or if they want to purchase a
certain franchise and the franchisor requires arbitration, then they have no choice in whether they
will arbitrate any disputes related to that product, job, or franchise. See supra notes 16548 and
accompanying text. Second, the procedural justice studies show that parties want fair results (this is
true for studies performed before and after disputes arise). See, e.g., Naimark & Keer, supra note
69, at 204. The problem is that before disputes arise, parties discount the possibility of a dispute
ever arising. Then after disputes arise, parties realize how limited their rights are under the
arbitration agreement. In other words, cost-benefit analyses performed before disputes arise may
tend to assign too little weight to the possibility of a dispute arising.
214. See Drahozal, supra note 150, at 235.
215. Other textual bases exist for sanctioning parties for frivolous appeals. See, e.g., FED. R.
APP. P. 38 ("If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately
filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and
single or double costs to the appellee."). However, explicitly including sanctions as a possibility for
frivolous appeals under the manifest-disregard standard should have an additional deterrent effect.
216. See B.L. Harbert Int'l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 913-14 (11th Cir. 2006)
("A realistic threat of sanctions may discourage baseless litigation over arbitration awards and help
fulfill the purposes of the pro-arbitration policy contained in the FAA."), abrogated by Frazer v.
CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. Texas Steel Co., 538 F.2d 1116, 1121 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that courts have authority
to award costs for frivolous appeals from arbitration awards).
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Circuit recently did so. 2 17 And it did so based in part on the frequency of
parties seeking vacatur under this standard.2 18
While sanctions' effectiveness in deterring frivolous appeals may be
debatable,' 9 taking this step is appropriate in this context, particularly if
the sanctions are levied based on an objective standard. That is, courts
should consider whether the appeal itself has any merit, not whether the
attorneys filing it did so in bad faith.220  Subjective intent should be
irrelevant. Although this may deter some parties from filing valid appeals
under the manifest-disregard standard,22' it should also force attorneys to
"stop, think, and investigate" before filing an appeal, particularly if no
showing of bad faith is required before sanctions are imposed.222 This,
presumably, would reduce the number of meritless pro forma appeals
under manifest disregard.223
For the second tweak, a court should allow only the party forced into
arbitration to appeal for legal error under the broader manifest-disregard
standard. The obvious objection to such a rule is that businesses would
find it unfair-they would object to being bound by a legally inaccurate
217. B.L. Harbert Int'l, 441 F.3d at 914 ("The warning this opinion provides is that in order to
further the purposes of the FAA and to protect arbitration as a remedy we are ready, willing, and
able to consider imposing sanctions in appropriate cases."). Remember, however, that the B.L.
Harbert court made this announcement based on the current manifest-disregard standard. It would
be easier for courts to issue sanctions under the current standard, which requires some proof that the
arbitrator consciously disregarded known, applicable law than it would under my proposed standard,
which requires only legal error.
218. Id. ("The notice it provides, hopefully to even the least astute reader, is that this Court is
exasperated by those who attempt to salvage arbitration losses through litigation that has no sound
basis in the law applicable to arbitration awards."). Parties rely on manifest disregard in attempting
to overtum arbitration awards more than any other ground for vacatur. See, e.g., LeRoy & Feuille,
supra note 10, at 189; Scodro, supra note 94, at 566-67.
219. See Mark R. Kravitz, Unpleasant Duties: Imposing Sanctions for Frivolous Appeals, 4 J.
APP. PRAc. & PROcESS 335, 343-47 (2002) (noting that some courts are reluctant to impose
sanctions for frivolous appeals even though they have the statutory authority to do so, which, of
course, would have a negative effect on deterrence); see also Roger J. Miner, Lecture, Professional
Responsibility in Appellate Practice: A View from the Bench, 19 PACE L. REV. 323, 341 (1999) ("[1]t
is a rare case in which we sanction even those who take frivolous appeals.").
220. See generally Scott A. Martin, Note, Keeping Courts Afloat in a Rising Sea of Litigation:
An Objective Approach to Imposing Rule 38 Sanctions for Frivolous Appeals, 100 MICH. L. REV.
1156 (2002) (noting courts' disagreement over whether bad faith should be a consideration in
levying sanctions and suggesting an objective standard for courts to use).
221. See Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1071 (1985) ("Creating a risk that the
invocation of the judicial process may give rise to punitive sanctions simply because the litigant's
claim is unmeritorious could only deter the legitimate exercise of the right to seek a peaceful redress
of grievances through judicial means.").
222. Martin, supra note 220, at 1180 (quoting Berwick Grain Co. v. Ill. Dep't of Agric., 217 F.3d
502, 505 (7th Cir. 2000)). Although the Berwick Grain case involved sanctions under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11, the same principle should apply to sanctions for frivolous appeals.
223. See id at 1179-81.
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award when the other party is not. But businesses can still rely on the
narrow manifest-disregard standard.22 4 And they can still manipulate the
procedural fairness of arbitration by drafting the arbitration agreement.
For example, they may still contract around any default rules that might
otherwise favor consumers, employees, and the others who are forced to
arbitrate.22 5 Thus, they would simply have to weigh the limitation on
their right to appeal under the broader standard against their ability to
otherwise shape arbitration procedures and then make an economic
decision on whether to continue requiring mandatory arbitration.
The third tweak to this basic proposal is that I would require
reasoned opinions in mandatory arbitration.226  While requiring reasoned
opinions would increase the formality and expense of the arbitration,
which is the main objection to such a rule,22 7 it would simplify the task of
reviewing the awards for legal error. Both the parties involved and the
appellate court would have a better understanding of how the arbitrator
decided the case.22 8  Also, this would increase the likelihood that
arbitrators would at least try to follow the law, thus increasing the
accuracy of awards while reducing the likelihood of judicial review.22 9
So, for mandatory arbitration at least, the benefits of reasoned opinions
224. Although, courts should apply sanctions for frivolous appeals under this standard, too.
225. But any attempt to contract around default rules would be reviewed under the
unconscionability standard. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996).
226. Labor arbitrators usually already provide written opinions, so the rule I propose should not
affect arbitrations between employers and employees. See Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for
Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial
Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASII. L. REV. 443, 444 n.3 (1998) ("Labor arbitrators write
reasoned awards because the parties to the labor arbitration process expect them to do so. Over the
fifty-odd years of labor arbitration in the United States, those substantive written awards have
become an integral part and a primary dimension of the process.").
227. Id. at 446-47.
228. Id at 447 ("Ironically, an award made without explanation of the arbitral analysis upon
which it is based may well encourage attempts to vacate, because the loser in arbitration has 'no
principled basis for accepting, however reluctantly, the wisdom of the award."' (quoting Stephen
Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment and Call for
Dialogue, 10 O00 ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 343, 402 (1995))).
229. Arbitrators would not want a high reversal rate because it would decrease their
marketability. Parties to arbitration would avoid selecting them as arbitrators out of fear that they
would make an error in the award, thereby increasing the likelihood of an appeal. Also, although
arbitration has measures in place to protect against bias, my proposal increases those protections.
Because arbitrators would want a low reversal rate under my proposal, they would be less inclined to
rule in one party's favor because of bias. See Thomas Burch, Necessity Never Made a Good
Bargain: When Consumer Arbitration Agreements Prohibit Class Relief 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1005, 1032-33 (2004) (noting the incentives that arbitrators and arbitration institutions already have
to remain unbiased).
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outweigh their costs and would improve the procedural fairness of
mandatory arbitration for the parties subjected to it.230
Overall, this proposal makes mandatory arbitration more palatable
from a procedural-justice standpoint because it enhances accuracy and
provides greater decision control. 1  It also makes mandatory
arbitration's procedures seem more fair, and it provides an alternative to
the elimination of mandatory arbitration altogether. Moreover, it
attempts to fix some of the problems with manifest disregard as it is
currently defined. While these fixes may not be perfect, they are an
improvement over the current manifest-disregard standard, which, when
applied narrowly, negatively impacts mandatory arbitration's procedural
justice.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has made little effort to define manifest
disregard in the fifty years since it created the doctrine, so lower courts
have been free to apply the doctrine as they see fit. While most have
applied it narrowly in the name of efficiency, some have applied it
broadly by reviewing awards for legal error. Consequently, manifest
disregard has become central in the debate over whether efficiency or
accuracy is the more important arbitration policy.
The relative emphasis placed on efficiency and accuracy should
depend on the type of arbitration. Pure commercial arbitrations are
intended to be an efficient process, and the parties to those arbitrations
care less about the accuracy of their awards. So it makes sense that we
should limit judicial review in that context. But for mandatory
arbitration, noncommercial parties have little choice in deciding whether
to accept the arbitration clause-if they even know it is in their
agreement-and the agreement itself is drafted to favor the commercial
party.232 It thus makes sense to give the parties subjected to mandatory
arbitration greater procedural protections.
230. My proposal could work without the reasoned opinion requirement. Courts could still
review the record and attempt to deternine whether the arbitrator made a mistake. However,
requiring courts to discern legal error from the record would be less efficient and less likely to result
in vacated awards.
231. While commercial parties who mandate arbitration in their agreements may disagree, at the
very least my proposal offers an alternative to the elimination of mandatory arbitration altogether, an
idea that is gaining popular appeal. See sources cited supra note 5.
232. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 75, at 7.
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The proposal here does that. Specifically, it increases decision
control for the parties who are subjected to mandatory arbitration by
allowing those parties to appeal arbitrators' awards for legal error. But
to avoid overwhelming courts with appeals, it also allows courts to
sanction parties for frivolous appeals based on an objective standard that
requires no bad faith before sanctions are levied. It also incentivizes
arbitrators to avoid legal error because increased errors will result in
decreased demand for those arbitrators' services. Overall, this proposal
provides an alternative to the incoherent and inequitable manifest-
disregard standard that we currently have, and, more broadly, it offers an
alternative to eliminating mandatory arbitration altogether-an idea that
seems to be gaining popular appeal. Thus, I submit it for consideration
as a new approach to the manifest-disregard standard going forward.
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